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Abstract—Despite the best intentions of disk and RAID manu-
facturers, on-disk data can still become corrupted. In this paper,
we examine the effects of corruption on database management
systems. Through injecting faults into the MySQL DBMS, we ﬁnd
that in certain cases, corruption can greatly harm the system,
leading to untimely crashes, data loss, or even incorrect results.
Overall, of 145 injected faults, 110 lead to serious problems. More
detailed observations point us to three deﬁciencies: MySQL does
not have the capability to detect some corruptions due to lack
of redundant information, does not isolate corrupted data from
valid data, and has inconsistent reactions to similar corruption
scenarios.
To detect and repair corruption, a DBMS is typically equipped
with an ofﬂine checker. Unfortunately, the MySQL ofﬂine checker
is not comprehensive in the checks it performs, misdiagnosing
many corruption scenarios and missing others. Sometimes the
checker itself crashes; more ominously, its incorrect checking
can lead to incorrect repairs. Overall, we ﬁnd that the checker
does not behave correctly in 18 of 145 injected corruptions, and
thus can leave the DBMS vulnerable to the problems described
above.
I. INTRODUCTION
Disks corrupt data. Although it is well known that entire
disks fail [29], [33], recent studies have shown that disks also
can corrupt data that they store [4]; in a study of 1.5 million
drives over three years, Bairavasundaram et al. found that
nearly 1% of SATA drives exhibited corruption. More reliable
SCSI drives encounter fewer problems, but even within this
expensive and carefully-engineered drive class, corruption still
takes place.
Fortunately, RAID vendors have employed increasingly
sophisticated corruption detection and recovery techniques in
order to combat disk corruption [6], [8]. For example, by
placing a checksum of data with every block, one can detect
whether a block has become corrupted; once detected, the
corruption can be repaired by accessing another copy of the
block or parity information.
Unfortunately, these schemes are not always enough. Recent
work has shown that even with sophisticated protection strate-
gies, the “right” combination of a single fault and certain repair
activities (e.g., a parity scrub) can still lead to data loss [19].
Thus, while these schemes reduce the chances of corruption,
the possibility still exists; any higher-level client of storage
that is serious about managing data reliably must consider the
possibility that a disk will return data in a corrupted form.
In this paper, to better understand the possible problems
caused by disk corruption, we ﬁrst observe its impact on a
database management system, the MySQL DBMS, through a
series of fault injections. By carefully injecting corruptions
into a running MySQL server, we can evaluate how MySQL
deals with disk corruption. More speciﬁcally, we want to
answer three questions: Can MySQL detect disk corruption
properly? Can MySQL keep running and return valid data
despite the presence of corruption? What can we infer about
the framework for corruption handling in MySQL?
We ﬁnd that corruption can be quite damaging, leading to
system crashes, data loss, and even incorrect results. Overall,
of 145 injected faults, 110 lead to serious problems. More
detailed observations point us to three deﬁciencies in MySQL.
First, MySQL ignores some corruptions; some are detectable
but ignored and some are undetectable due to lack of redun-
dant information in its data structures. Second, MySQL does
not isolate corruption from valid data; a corrupt record can
make other valid records inaccessible. Finally, MySQL has
widely inconsistent corruption handling, which leads us to the
conclusion that MySQL does not employ a proper framework
for corruption handling.
Since all corruptions are hard to detect online, a DBMS
requires some form of ofﬂine corruption detection and repair
tools. In the world of ﬁle systems, ofﬂine tools such as the
ubiquitous ﬁle system checker (fsck) are used in this capacity
today [21]. Originally conceived to help ﬁle systems recover
from untimely crashes, fsck has remained a useful tool to
help the ﬁle system recover from unexpected corruption in
ﬁle system metadata. By carefully combing through the on-
disk image, fsck can ﬁnd and ﬁx many small problems.
One might think that a DBMS does not need such a
tool, as concurrency control and recovery has been carefully
developed to handle many similar problems [24]. However,
while concurrency control and recovery avoid many corruption
scenarios and are critical in recovering from others, in general
they are not able to catch or repair corruptedmetadata resulting
from disk malfunctions. The evidence from the marketplace
unfortunately conﬁrms this reality; many tools exist to detect
and repair these kinds of errors in commercial DBMSs, includ-
ing SQL Server [22], Oracle [26], [27], [28], and DB2 [16],
[17]. To an unfortunate extent, neither the problems these tools
address nor the approaches they employ in their solutions
have appeared in the research literature. A partial explanation
for this might be that such tools require detailed knowledge
of proprietary aspects of the DBMSs and how they store
and manage their metadata. However, the recent explosion inpopularity of open source DBMSs such as PostgreSQL [37]
and MySQL [39] has changed the landscape, and it is now
possible for the research community at large to explore issues
related to metadata corruption, and to do so in the meaningful
context of substantial systems with large user communities.
Therefore, in this paper, we also study how effective ofﬂine
checkers are at detecting corruption in an on-disk image
of a database. Speciﬁcally, we examine the robustness of
myisamchk, an ofﬂine checker for MySQL. We ﬁnd that the
ofﬂine checker is not comprehensive in the checks it performs,
misdiagnosing many corruption scenarios and missing others.
Sometimes the checker itself crashes. More ominously, its in-
correct checking can lead to incorrect repairs. Overall, we ﬁnd
that myisamchk does not behave correctly in 18 of 145 injected
corruptions, and thus can leave the DBMS vulnerable to the
problems described above, including unexpected crashes, data
loss, and incorrect results.
Thus, in this paper, we make two explicit contributions:
• We perform the ﬁrst study of the effect of corruption on a
running database (MySQL), and ﬁnd that corruption can
cause great harm (Section IV).
• We perform the ﬁrst study of the ability of an existing
ofﬂine checking tool (myisamchk) to detect corruption in
on-disk structures, and ﬁnd that it misses many signiﬁcant
cases (Section V).
Before describing each of our two main contributions, we
ﬁrst present the background and related work (Section II) and
then our fault injection methodology (Section III). After the
main body of the paper, we conclude with future directions
(Section VI).
II. BACKGROUND & RELATED WORK
In this section, we provide a brief background on disk
failures, with a focus on corruption. We then discuss why
RAID is not a complete solution in dealing with corruption.
After that, we brieﬂy discuss the state of the art of both online
and ofﬂine corruption detection techniques within ﬁle systems
as well as the current approach within DBMS.
A. Disk Corruption: Why It Happens?
We broadly deﬁne disk corruption as something that occurs
when one reads a block of data from the disk and receives
unexpected contents (e.g., the contents are not what were
previously written to that location). Thus, the read “succeeds”
(i.e., the disk does not return a failure code) but the data within
the block is not as expected. For this reason, corruption is
sometimes referred to as a silent error.
Disk corruption can occur for a multitude of reasons. One
cause comes from the magnetic media: the classic problem
of “bit rot” which occurs when the magnetism of a single
bit or a few bits are ﬂipped. This type of problem can often
(but not always) be detected and corrected with low-level ECC
embedded in the drive.
Interesting errors also arise in the disk controllers due to
their complexity; modern Seagate drives contain hundreds of
thousands of lines of low-level ﬁrmware code that manage
the operation of the disk [30]. This complexity can lead to a
number of bugs which manifest as corruption.
One example of such a bug is a lost write (or phantom
write), where a disk reports that a write has completed but in
fact it was never written to the disk [40]. The next time a client
reads such a block, it will receive the old contents, and thus
perceive the problem as a corruption. A misconﬁgured drive
can also result in lost writes; for example, if a drive cache is
set to write-back mode (instead of write-through), a write will
be acknowledged when it is put into the disk cache but before
it has been written to disk. If power is lost before the actual
write to the media surface, the write is seemingly lost.
A similar problem is known as a misdirected write [44]. In
this case, the controller writes the data to disk but to the wrong
location. A misdirected write can thus lead to two perceived
corruptions; one where the block should have been written,
and one where the block was accidentally written. In either
case, subsequent reads receive the “wrong” contents.
There are other causes of perceived disk corruption. For
example, as data sits in the main memory of a host system,
a bad DRAM could corrupt the data [20]; although it is
written correctly to disk, the data is corrupt when written and
will later be perceived as such. Similarly, buggy operating
systems software [10], [12] could accidentally overwrite the
in-memory data before writing it to the disk, again leading to
a subsequently perceived corruption.
B. Disk Corruption: How Often It Occurs?
Until recently, there was very little data on how often
corruption arose in modern storage systems. Although there
was much anecdotal information [6], [40], [44], and a host
of protection techniques that systems employ to handle such
corruption [19], there was little hard data.
Recently, a study by Bairavasundaram et al. demonstrates
that corruption does indeed occur across a broad range of
modern drives [4]. In that study of 1.5 million disk drives
deployed in the ﬁeld, the authors found more than 400,000
blocks have checksum mismatches over three years. They
also found that nearline disks develop checksum mismatches
an order of magnitude more often than enterprise class disk
drives. Furthermore, checksum mismatches within the same
disk show high spatial and temporal locality, and checksum
mismatches across different disks in the same storage system
are not independent. The data shows that corruption takes
place, and systems must be prepared to handle it.
C. Doesn’t RAID Help?
The end-to-end argument states that failure recovery must
be done at the highest level; protection mechanisms at lower
levels may improve performance but fundamentally do not
solve the desired problem [32]. In the world of storagesystems, it would be ideal if RAID storage [29] guaranteed that
data was not corrupt. Although we believe that while RAID
can indeed improve DBMS reliability, it is not a complete
solution for the following reasons.
First, RAID is designed to tolerate the loss of a certain
number of disks or blocks (e.g., RAID-5 tolerates one, and
RAID-6 tolerates two), but not to to identify corruption. For
example, in RAID-5, if a block in a parity set is corrupt, the
parity computationwill be incorrect, but which block is corrupt
cannot be identiﬁed with RAID alone.
Second, ironically, commercial RAID systems also corrupt
data; a recent paper by Krioukov et al. demonstrates how most
commercial RAID-5 designs, which should be able to tolerate
the loss of any one disk or block, have ﬂaws where a single
block loss leads to data loss or silent corruption [19].
Finally, not all systems incorporate more than one disk. For
example, consider a typical commodity system running with
a single disk drive; in such systems, there is essentially no
protection against most forms of corruption described above.
D. Doesn’t Checksumming Help?
Checksumming techniques have been used in numerous
systems over the years to detect data corruption [6], [11], [36],
[38], [40]. For example, Tandem systems have long employed
checksums [6]. When a block is read from disk, so too is
its stored checksum. A checksum is then computed over the
data block and compared to the stored checksum; if the two
do not match, the block is declared corrupt and recovered
from a mirror copy. Similar to RAID, although checksums
can improve corruption detection, it is still not a complete
solution for three reasons.
First, memory is not perfect. For example, a bit-ﬂip in
memory before a checksum is computed could lead to a
corrupt block being written to disk; the disk system will safely
store the corrupted block. A recent, large-scale ﬁeld study by
Schroeder et al. emphatically show that bit-ﬂips do occur [34].
Second, software is not perfect; large code bases are typi-
cally full of bugs [10], [45]. Some of those bugs may indeed
corrupt data before it is written to disk, and again may thus
survive despite checksum and RAID protections.
Lastly, Krioukov et al. also show that checksumming does
not protect against complex failures such as torn writes, lost
writes, and misdirected writes [19].
E. The File System Approach
Many high-end ﬁle systems often claim that they have
support for corruption handling. However, their robustness is
little known due to the proprietary nature of these systems.
With open-source ﬁle systems, there is room for evaluation.
For example, Prabhakaran et al. presented the details of
corruption detections in several commodity ﬁle systems [30],
including Linux ext3 ﬁle system [42], ReiserFS [31], IBM
JFS [7], and Windows NTFS.
In many cases, they found that these ﬁle systems are able to
detect metadata corruption in the absence of checksums. Their
approach is to store implicit redundant information to cross-
check metadata consistency. For example, ﬁle systems such
as ReiserFS [9] and XFS [41] store page-level information in
each internal page of a B-Tree. Thus, a corrupt pointer that
does not connect two pages in adjacent levels can be detected
checking the page-level information. These ﬁle systems show
that some redundant information can be useful for online
cross-checking without imposing signiﬁcant overhead.
Although many corruptions are detected, Prabhakaran et
al. also found that in some cases these ﬁle systems fail to
check the integrity of their own metadata. They show that the
undetected corruptions result in system crashes, the spreading
of corruption, and unmountable ﬁle systems [30].
To remedy this problem, ﬁle system developers created
ofﬂine tools to scan and repair ﬁle system metadata that was
inconsistent. The classic repair tool is fsck [21]. Despite the
presence of RAID and checksumming, fsck remains useful
even today; high-end ﬁle systems also have their own ofﬂine
checkers. Some new ﬁle systems have tried to make do without
an ofﬂine checker, e.g., SGI’s XFS famously was said to have
“no need to fsck, ever” [13], but soon introduced such a tool
to handle corruptions that were observed in the ﬁeld.
Unfortunately, building a robust checker is not straightfor-
ward. An analysis of the Linux ext2 checker by Gunawi et al.
shows that some important repairs are missing, leaving some
corruptions unattended, and some repairs are incorrect, making
the ﬁle system more corrupt and sometimes unusable [15].
F. The DBMS Approach
In the DBMS world, there have been many reports of
database corruptions [1], [2]. In many cases, the sources of the
corruptions are hard to pinpoint, and hence are not reported.
Nevertheless, the fact that error messages such as “Database
page corruption on disk” appear in the error logs suggest that
database systems read corrupt contents from the disk. But
again, the research literature has not extensively addressed how
running databases deal with such corruption.
The presence of ofﬂine tools to scan and repair database
metadata is also less clear. Some tools exist [16], [17], [22],
[26], [27], [28]. The existence of the tools certainly indicates
that databases are corrupted in practice, despite the presence of
RAID and checksums. However, due to the proprietary nature
of these database systems and their on-disk formats, there is
little published on the details of how these ofﬂine check and
repair tools work.
Evaluations of open-source ﬁle systems have unearthed
many weaknesses in the ways modern ﬁle systems deal with
corruption [15], [30]. However, to the best of our knowledge,
there has been no similar published study in the DBMS
literature. However, as open-source database systems such as
PostgreSQL [37] and MySQL [39] have become both popular
and important, we believe a new opportunity has arisen to
both evaluate the state of the art of database checking and
potentially to improve it. The open nature of these systems
make evaluation possible, and in this paper (Sections IVand V), we demonstrate how fault injection can be used to
assess the resilience of MySQL (in particular) to various types
of corruption.
III. METHODOLOGY
An integral part of ensuring the long-term availability of
data is ensuring the reliability and availability of pointers and
format information. Pointers are fundamental to the construc-
tion of nearly all data structures, while format information is
critical for the correctness of reading the data and metadata.
This observation is especially true for database management
systems, which rely on pointers to access data correctly and
efﬁciently, and on format information to determine how to
parse both metadata and data. Unfortunately, as mentioned
in the previous section, information stored on a disk can
be corrupt. A robust DBMS should detect and repair such
corruption of its metadata.
One difﬁculty with a pointer-corruption study is the poten-
tially huge exploration space for corruption experiments. To
deal with this problem, we utilize a fault injection technique
called type-aware pointer corruption (TAC) [5]. TAC reduces
the search space by systematically changing the value of only
one pointer of each type in the DBMS, then exercising the
DBMS and observing its behavior. We further narrow the large
search space by corrupting the pointers to refer to each type of
data structure, instead of to random values. For example, rather
than corrupting a B-Tree pointer to point to a random page, we
introduce types to the pages (e.g., grand-child, sibling, parent
page), and then change the pointer to point to different types
of pages.
TAC simulates ﬁeld-level corruption. As mentioned in Sec-
tion II-A, different problems can lead to different types of
corruption. For example, a misdirected write can corrupt
everything on a page, not just a particular ﬁeld. This type
of page-level corruption can be simulated as well by slightly
extending our fault-injection framework. So far, we have only
considered ﬁeld-level corruption as it allows for detailed anal-
ysis of the system’s responses to different ﬁeld-corruptions.
To exercise the DBMS as thoroughly as possible, another
challenge is to coerce the DBMS down its different code paths
to observe how each path handles corruption. This requires
that we run workloads exercising all relevant code paths in
combination with the induced faults. In this paper, we only
focus on read workloads. Speciﬁcally, we run three kinds of
queries: single selection queries (e.g., WHERE ﬁeld = X),
range selection queries (e.g., WHERE ﬁeld BETWEEN X
AND Y), and full table scans. By running different queries,
we can analyze how the injected corruptions affect different
workloads.
Section IV presents the results of our online pointer and
format corruptions for MySQL. Speciﬁcally, we inject corrup-
tions when the server is running and observe if it detects and
handles the corruptions. Unfortunately, some corruptions are
not detected online. Thus, we then inject the same corruptions
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Fig. 1.
B-Tree pointer corruption. The graph above shows key-pages of
an index B-Tree. Each box represents a key-page which contains a
set of key-pointer pairs. A pointer is a page number. We corrupt three
target pointers of a non-leaf page (page A): left-most (LP), middle
(MP), and right-most (RP) pointers. For example, the LP pointer can
be corrupted to point to the parent page (page B).
and analyze whether the MySQL ofﬂine checker is able to
detect them (Section V). As we will see, even the ofﬂine
checker fails to detect some of the corruptions, thus leaving
the DBMS vulnerable to on-disk corruption.
All experiments except where speciﬁed are performedon the
MyISAM Storage Engine of MySQL version 5.0.67 running
on the Linux 2.6.12 operating system. We have not tested
MySQL with other storage engines. In total we have injected
145 corruption scenarios. Due to the sheer volume of ex-
perimental data, it is difﬁcult to present all results for the
reader’s inspection. We try to present the complete results of
our analysis in tables (for those interested in all the data),
and then provide qualitative summaries of the results that are
presented within the tables.
IV. ONLINE CORRUPTION
Despite the presence of corruption, we expect a running
DBMS to be highly reliable and available. More speciﬁcally,
we expect a reliable DBMS to have a strong mechanism for
detecting disk corruption such that corrupt metadata is not
wrongly used by the DBMS. Moreover, to be highly available,
a DBMS has to keep running and return as much valid data as
possible to the users. To see how MySQL stands with respect
to these issues, we pose three questions that relate to reliability,
availability, and framework for corruption handling:
1) Can MySQL detect disk corruption properly?A B C D E F G H I J K L M
MP × ×  =  =  =  =  =  =  =  =  =
√ √
LP × ×  =  =  =  =  =  =  =  =  =
√ √
RP × ×  =  =  =  =  =  =  =  =  =
√ √
(a) Single selection query
A B C D E F G H I J K L M
MP × ×  =
√ √ √ √
 =  =  =  =
√ √
LP × ×  =  =  =  =  =  =  =  =  =
√ √
RP × ×  =  =  =  =  =  =  =  =  =
√ √
(b) Range selection query
TABLE I
Online detection of B-Tree pointer corruption. The tables above report the results of our B-Tree pointer corruption. The results depend
on the query that is executed. The ﬁrst and the second tables show the results of a single and a range selection query respectively. The
left-most column shows the pointers that we corrupt (i.e., MP, LP, and RP, as illustrated in Figure 1). The row-header represents the new
pages (i.e., page A to M) that the corrupted pointer is now pointing to. “
√
” marks that the corruption is detected; for example, when MP
points to an out-of-bound page (M). “×” represents a server crash; for example, when a cycle is introduced when MP points to itself (page
A). “ =” implies that the server returns the wrong results to the user; for example, when MP points to its grand-child (page C), records made
inaccessible by this corruption are not returned to the user.
2) Can MySQL keep running and return valid data despite
the presence of corruption?
3) Based on our results, what can we infer about the
framework for corruption handling in MySQL?
To answer these questions, we ﬁrst present the results of
our fault-injection experiments on a running MySQL server
(Section IV-A). Then, we answer the questions by presenting
our qualitative observations on the results (Section IV-B).
Finally, we conclude this section and present some preliminary
results for PostgreSQL (Section IV-C).
A. Results
In this section, we present the results of our online pointer
and format corruptions. For pointer corruption, we corrupt the
B-Tree, record, and overﬂow pointers. For format corruption,
we corrupt the format information stored in the index and data
ﬁles. For each corruption case, we describe the MySQL data
structures that we corrupt, our ﬁndings and observations. In
all cases, we ﬁnd that the presence of corruption would lead
to server crashes, data loss, or even incorrect results.
1) B-Tree Pointer Corruption: The ﬁrst class of pointer
corruption that we inject is B-Tree pointer corruption. For
each database table, MySQL manages three ﬁles: an index
ﬁle (.MYI), a format ﬁle (.FRM), and a data ﬁle (.MYD). For
each index deﬁned on a table, MySQL stores a B-Tree in the
index ﬁle in the form of key-pages (we also refer to a key-
page as a page). A page is usually 1 KB. The index ﬁle has
a header page (index ﬁle header) that has pointers to the root
pages of all B-Trees in the index ﬁle. A key-page contains a
header (page header), describing the key-page, and a set of
key-value pairs where the value carries two pointers: a key-
pointer (i.e., page number) which points to a child page and a
record-pointer which points to the corresponding record stored
in the data ﬁle. In this experiment, we corrupt the key-pointer
by making it point to another page and observe how MySQL
handles this class of corruption while it is running.
Figure 1 illustrates a 5-level B-Tree. We corrupt three
distinct pointers: the left-most (LP), middle (MP), and right-
most (RP) pointers of a non-leaf page (page A). To exercise
corruption scenarios, we corrupt these pointers. To reduce the
corruption space, we identify eleven categories of pages (pages
A to K as shown in Figure 1). For example, we corrupt the
left-most pointer (LP) to point to: the parent (page B), left
cousin (page E), left nephew (page F), and so on. To be able
to detect the corruptions, two keys that wrap the middle pointer
(key1 and key2) can be utilized.
Table I summarizes our results. In addition to corrupting
the three pointers to point to page A to K, we also force them
to point to pages belonging to the index ﬁle header (page
L) and to out-of-bound pages (page M). To analyze how the
corruptions affect different workloads, we also run two types
of queries: single and range-selection queries. In total, we have
injected 39 B-Tree pointer corruption scenarios. Unfortunately,
MySQL does not detect and handle many of these corruptions
online; MySQL returns wrong results to users, or the server
crashes. Below, we further explain the results.
Detected error (
√
): Out of the 39 scenarios, MySQL
detects only 6 or 10 of them depending if we execute a single
or a range-selection query. Most of the corruptions detected are
those where pointers point to an out-of-bound page (M) or to a
page belonging to an index ﬁle header (L). The former is easily
detected because reading an out-of-bound page will result in
a low-level read error. The latter is detected because MySQL
always checks the key-page header, speciﬁcally the length of
used key-value pairs in the page (which should always be00 01 02 03 04 05 06 0D Data Out-of-bound
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TABLE II
Online detection of overﬂow pointer corruption. The table above reports the results of our overﬂow pointer corruption. “×” marks
that the server hangs and“
√
” represents that the corruption is detected. When an overﬂow corruption is detected, depending on the type of
the corruption, MySQL reacts differently: sometimes it does not return any valid data and marks the corresponding table as crashed (♠),
sometimes returns partial valid data and kills the executed query (♣), and sometimes returns all valid data and skips the corrupt record
without notifying the corruption to the user (•).
greater than 4 bytes and less than 1 KB). Pages that belong
to the index ﬁle header have different structures that always
store “0xFE 0xFE” at the same byte offset. Thus, MySQL can
detect that they are not valid key-pages.
Wrong results ( =): In many cases, MySQL blindly trusts
the corrupt pointers. As a result, incorrect results are returned
to users. Speciﬁcally, users could get empty records or the
wrong number of records (since portions of the tree are silently
lost). For example, this can happen when the middle pointer
points to its grand-child page (e.g., MP points to page C).
All the keys in the grand-child page are valid with respect to
key1 and key2. Thus, the corruption is not easily detectable
and some portions of the B-Tree (other pages reachable from
the MP page) are not reachable anymore.
Server crashes (×): Finally, MySQL does not anticipate a
cycle; when the three target pointers are corrupted to point to
the page where they are stored (page A) or to the parent of
that page (page B), MySQL server does not detect the created
loop. The server keeps calling the search routine on the same
pages inﬁnitely. This routine only stops when the result is
found or not found. Since the MySQL server does not track
the previous pages that have been traversed, this loop causes
an inﬁnite traversal that eventually causes a stack overﬂow.
The server crashes, and a lost connection error occurs.
2) Record Pointer Corruption: In our next set of experi-
ments, we inject record pointer corruption. Record pointers
are stored in key-pages in the index ﬁle. A record pointer
of a key-value pair points to the actual record that holds the
corresponding key. We have injected numerous corruptions.
Here, we brieﬂy describe the interesting results.
First, we created a table with ﬁxed-size records with an
auto-incremented key and corrupt a record pointer of a key-
value in the index ﬁle such that it points to another record
in the table. Thus, the key stored in a corrupt key-value pair
does not match with the key stored in the record that it points
to. For example, we take a key-value pair with a key of 500
and corrupt it by making the record pointer points to a record
with a key of 600.
We ran a single selection query on the key (SELECT *
WHERE key = 500), and the server behaves correctly; the
server returns an empty result. We suspect that MySQL veriﬁes
that the record pointed by the corrupt key-value pair does not
have the same key.
We observed a different behavior when we ran a range
selection query (e.g., selecting records with keys between
450 to 550); MySQL only returns a subset of the records,
speciﬁcally records with keys between 450 to 499. MySQL
always trusts the key stored in the record; when the B-Tree
traversal hits key 500, it ﬁnds that the key in the record is 600,
which is larger than the end of the range query (550). Thus, the
server stops traversing the B-Tree and only returns a subset of
the records. This conﬁrms that when a range selection query
is executed, MySQL never checks the fact that the key in the
record is different than the key in the key-value pair.
Another interesting result is when we corrupt the record
pointer of a dynamic (variable-length) record. With dynamic
records, the record pointer is a byte offset, which implies that
it can point to any byte in the data ﬁle. In this case, MySQL
always checks the record information (e.g., record length) in
the record header. In the case of a corrupt pointer, the record
length is not as desired. MySQL returns an error code to users
without giving any result. The error states that the table has
been marked as crashed and should be repaired.
3) Overﬂow Pointer Corruption: Next, we inject pointer
corruptions into the data ﬁle. With ﬁxed-size records, the
data ﬁle does not store any pointers because a record can
be fetched given its record number. With the variable-length
record format, a record cannot always span contiguous bytes.
Thus, a record can be put in one or more frames. When a
record is deleted, all the frames that it occupies are marked
deleted. When a record is inserted, it can reuse unused frames.
If the new record does not ﬁt in a frame, multiple frames are
allocated for the record. Thus, in each frame, MySQL stores a
pointer (the overﬂow pointer) to the next frame and a signature
header that describes the frame. Only frames with hexadecimal
signatures 05, 06, 0B, 0C, and 0D have an overﬂow pointer.
This overﬂow pointer cannot point to all types of frames;
a valid pointer can only point to a frame with a signature
between 07 and 0C; more details can be found elsewhere [25].
Table II shows the result of our overﬂow pointer corruption.
We inject corruptions that make an overﬂow pointer invalid.
For example, a starting frame of a small record (05) shouldSig: 01 Sig: 01 Sig: 03 Sig: 07
Infinite loop
Corrupt pointer Valid pointer
Rec #0 Rec #1 Rec #1 Rec #2
Fig. 2.
Server hangs. The ﬁgure illustrates a corruption scenario that causes
MySQL server hangs.
not point to a deleted framed (00). Furthermore, because an
overﬂow pointer is a byte offset (i.e., it can point to any byte
in the data ﬁle), we also force an overﬂow pointer points to
data and to an out-of-bound offset.
We found that MySQL detects all overﬂow pointer errors
(
√
). However, depending on the corruption, different results
are returned and different error messages are thrown. For
example, if an overﬂow pointer accidentally points to data,
MySQL is very conservative by not returning any valid data
(even though it has fetched some), but rather emits an error
message stating that the table has been marked as crashed
and should be repaired (♠). However, if an overﬂow pointer
points to an out-of-bound offset, the server kills the executed
query by returning only valid records that have been fetched
so far (♣). Finally, if an overﬂow pointer points to an invalid
frame, the server detects the error, skips this corrupt record,
and continues scanning the next record (•). The users then
would get all valid records, even those that are located after
the corrupted record. In this case, the server does not propagate
the error message to users.
Moreover, a certain scenario of overﬂow pointer corruption
makes the server enter an inﬁnite loop (×). Speciﬁcally, this
happens on a full-scan query when an overﬂow pointer points
to an invalid frame that is located before the frame that holds
the overﬂow pointer. Figure 2 illustrates the bug. MySQL
scans the variable-length frames one-by-one, looking for any
starting frame. When there is an invalid overﬂow pointer
(e.g., the starting frame of record #1 points to the starting
frame of record #0), the corruption is detected from the given
signatures. But, rather than moving to the next valid frame
(i.e., record #2), MySQL scans the wrong next frame, (i.e.,
record #1, which is the frame next to the invalid frame). In
this case, the server gets stuck in an inﬁnite loop.
Beyond the corruption scenarios shown in the matrix in
Table II, we also performed a more speciﬁc fault injection:
an overﬂow pointer is corrupted to point to a “valid” frame
that actually belongs to another record. But, in MySQL, a
frame does not hold information about its owner. Thus, it is not
straightforward for MySQL to detect this corruption online. As
a result, the corrupt record is presented to users like a valid
record, except part of the data belongs to another record.
4) Index Format Corruption: We now corrupt important
format information that is stored in the index ﬁle header,
shown in the left column of Table III. This format information
is crucial for parsing both metadata (e.g., keys, key-pointers,
etc.) and data (e.g., columns). Due to space constraints, we
do not provide the descriptions of the ﬁelds; their descriptions
can be found elsewhere [25]. For each ﬁeld, we corrupt the
value to zero (0), a value less than the actual one (<), a value
larger than the actual one (>), and the maximum possible
value (Max). Format information is used differently depending
on the query workload. Thus, we ran three types of query:
full-scan, single selection, and range selection.
Table III depicts how various types of format corruption
are handled in an inconsistent manner; some corruptions are
detected (
√
), some are not. When a corruption is not detected,
MySQL sometimes returns incorrect results to the user ( =),
sometimes returns valid results (.), leaving the corruption un-
noticeable, and sometimes crashes (×) in some unanticipated
scenarios.
5) Record Format Corruption: In our ﬁnal online exper-
iment, we corrupt dynamic-record length information stored
in the data ﬁle. MySQL is able to detect the discrepancy
between the length of a record and the total length of its
frames. MySQL tracks the cumulative length of the frames that
have been fetched with respect to a record. If the cumulative
length is larger than the record length, MySQL stops the
query and returns only valid records that have been fetched so
far. However, if the cumulative length is less than the record
length, the server emits a hard error message saying that the
table has been marked as crashed and should be repaired.
B. Observations
We now answer the questions we posed earlier in the
paper. In short, our results have shown that MySQL does
not detect all kinds of corruption that can arise, the MySQL
server is not highly available in the midst of corruptions,
and ﬁnally MySQL does not have a consistent framework for
corruption handling. Below, we describe these observations in
more detail.
1) Incomplete Detection: We ﬁnd that MySQL ignores
many corruptions, which leads to incorrect results being re-
turned, crashes, and data loss. After further analysis, we ﬁnd
two reasons for these problems: in some cases MySQL ignores
detectable corruptions and in some other cases MySQL does
not have the ability to detect certain corruptions.
Ignored detectable corruptions: There are cases where
corruption can be detected from implicit redundant infor-
mation stored in MySQL data structures. Thus, with some
additional work, some corruptions are actually detectable.
However, detectability does not always lead to detection as
we see in these three examples:
First, in B-Tree pointer corruption (Section IV-A.1), when
a pointer is corrupt such that it points to a page not reachable
from the parent page (e.g., MP points to page D through K
in Figure 1), MySQL could detect this by checking the keys
with respect to key1 and key2. However, since MySQL doesFull scan Single selection Range selection
Format info 0 < > Max 0 < > Max 0 < > Max
State header
header length
√ √
.
√ √ √
.
√ √ √
.
√
keys
√ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √
number of records  = . . .  = . . .  = . . .
data ﬁle length  =  =
√ √
 =  = . .  =  =
√
.
Base header
record length
√ √
× ×
√ √
× ×
√ √
× ×
pack rec. length
√ √
× ×  =  =  = ×  =  =  = ×
rec ref. length
√
.
√ √
×
√ √ √
×
√ √ √
key ref. length . . . .  =
√
 =
√
×
√
×
√
max key blk len . . . . × . . . × . . .
ﬁelds . .
√ √
. .
√ √
. .
√ √
Key def.
key segments
√ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √
block length . . . . × .
√ √
× .
√ √
Key segment
length . . . .  =
√
. ×
√ √ √
×
Record info
length . .
√ √
. .
√ √
. .
√ √
TABLE III
Online detection of format corruption. The table above reports MySQL corruption handling of different format corruptions. We corrupt
a format value to zero (0), a value less than its actual value (<), a value larger than its actual value (>), and the maximum possible value
(Max). This format information is stored in the index ﬁle header. “×” represents a server crash, “ =” implies that the server returns wrong
results to the users, “.” marks that the corruption is silently ignored, and “
√
” marks that the corruption is detected.
not perform such a check, incorrect results are returned (“ =”
in Table I).
Second, a record pointer corruption (Section IV-A.2) should
be easily detectable; the MySQL server could compare the
key stored in the index with the one stored in the record.
But, rather than utilizing this redundant information, MySQL
always trusts the keys stored in the records. As a result,
incorrect results are returned.
Third, in the index format corruption(Section IV-A.4),when
the data ﬁle length speciﬁed in the state header is corrupted to
zero, MySQL returns no result to the user without any error
message, blindly believing that the data ﬁle is empty although
the number of records stored in the state header can give the
correct information. A similar situation occurs when the data
ﬁle length is corrupted to half of the actual value; MySQL only
scans half of the data ﬁle. Another example is when the server
crashes because the record length stored in the base header is
corrupted to a maximum value. These corruptions actually can
be caught simply by verifying the same information stored in
the format ﬁle.
Undetectable corruptions: We ﬁnd that several corruptions
are hard to detect because MySQL does not store enough
implicit redundant information in its data structures. We ﬁnd
many instances of this issue:
First, in the B-Tree pointer corruption (Section IV-A.1), it
is hard to verify that a pointer properly connects two pages in
adjacent levels because a page does not store its page level.
For example, if a pointer is corrupt such that it points to one
of its grand-children (e.g., MP points to its C in Figure 1),
MySQL cannot detect this easily.
Second, it is hard to detect an invalid root pointer because
the index ﬁle header does not store the height of the B-Tree
and the root page does not store its page level. Thus, a root
pointer that points to a non-root page is considered valid,
leading to a silent data loss (i.e., some pages connected from
the original root page are not reachable anymore). If the index
ﬁle header stores the height of the B-Tree and each key-page
has page-level information, their values can be cross-checked.
Third, it is difﬁcult to catch a page in a B-Tree that points to
another page belonging to another B-Tree because a page does
not store information about to which B-Tree it belongs to. A
table can have more than one index thus more than one B-Tree
can be saved in the same index ﬁle. A page in a B-Tree should
not be allowed to point to a page belonging to another B-Tree.
However, since the page does not specify owner information,
such a corruption scenario is not detected. As a result, users
get incorrect results or the server kills the executed query with
an error message.
Fourth, in the overﬂow pointer corruption (Section IV-A.3),
it is also hard to catch a frame in a record that points to
another frame belonging to another record because a frame
does not hold information about its owner. Thus, when a
corrupt overﬂow pointer points to a “valid” frame that actually
belongs to another record, MySQL cannot easily detect this
corruption online. As a result, the corrupt record is presented
to users like a valid record, except part of the data belongs to
another record.
Fifth, in the index format corruption (Section IV-A.4), it is
challenging to verify true leaf and non-leaf pages. The page
header has a one bit ﬁeld that speciﬁes whether the pageis a leaf page (bit = 0) or a non-leaf page (bit = 1). When
we corrupt the bit, thus making a non-leaf page a leaf page
and vice-versa, the server sometimes hits an inﬁnite loop,
sometimes returns an empty result to users, and sometimes
detects incorrect keys due to incorrect parsing. Detecting this
corruption is challenging if not impossible. If only redundant
information such as page level were stored in the page header,
such detection would be straightforward.
In summary, MySQL should peruse available information
in its data structures to cross-check its metadata consistency
to the greatest extent possible. Furthermore, our ﬁndings
also show that adding extra information might be useful for
corruption detection or even recovery. The ﬁle system story in
Section II shows that adding implicit redundancy can be done
efﬁciently.
2) Reduced Availability: A system crash reduces availabil-
ity. Thus, failure should be avoided in most systems. Un-
fortunately, in our experiments, we have shown that MySQL
crashes in many cases of corruption.
Reduced availability also happens when MySQL fails to
return valid data to users. When a minimal corruption occurs
we might wish MySQL give us as many valid records as
possible. For example, if there is only one corrupt record (e.g.,
due to a corrupt overﬂow pointer), we might wish valid records
were still accessible. However, that is not always the case in
MySQL. In the overﬂow pointer corruption (Section IV-A.3),
when an overﬂow pointer accidentally points to data, MySQL
does not return any valid records (“♠” in Table II). When an
overﬂow pointer points to an out-of-bound offset, the server
only returns valid records that have been fetched so far (“♣”
in Table II). Hence, due to this inconsistent handling, a small
corruption in MySQL can make a large number of records
inaccessible.
To improve availability, corruption should be detected and
isolated. Detection is crucial; our ﬁndings have shown that
corrupt metadata can lead to crashes. Worse, it might lead
to the propagation of the corruption. This result emphasizes
that catching corrupt metadata is a crucial factor in increasing
availability. Furthermore, after corrupt metadata is detected,
the corruption and also the operation on the metadata should
be isolated; more speciﬁcally, the operation should be able to
continue processing other valid metadata.
3) No Framework for Corruption Handling: Finally, we
believe that MySQL might not have a framework for corrup-
tion handling. This conclusion is suggested by its inconsistent
reactions in handling corruption. We deﬁne inconsistent han-
dling as the case where similar failure scenarios are handled
differently. From our results, we ﬁnd ﬁve cases of inconsistent
handling in each class of corruption we injected:
First, in the B-Tree pointer corruption (Section IV-A.1),
when we corrupt the middle pointer to point to any page
reachable from the left-uncle, MySQL detects the corruptions
(“
√
” in Table I-b when MP points to D, E, F, or G). However,
when the middle pointer is corrupted to point to any page
reachable from the right-uncle, MySQL does not detect the
corruptions and delivers the wrong results to the users (“ =”
in Table I-b when MP points to H, I, J, or K). These two
cases are similar but handled differently. It turns out that, for
the ﬁrst case, MySQL “coincidentally” detects the corruption;
the error message actually comes from the detection of an
out-of-bound key-pointer due to the abnormal behavior of the
search routine after it follows the corrupted middle pointer.
Second, in the record pointer corruption (Section IV-A.2),
MySQL reacts to a corrupt record pointer differently depend-
ing on the executed query. In the case of a single selection
query, users get correct (empty) result; in the case of a range
selection query, users get wrong (partial) results without any
errors thrown; in the case of a dynamic length record, a hard
error is thrown and no result is returned (even the valid ones).
This shows that MySQL corruption handling is sometimes soft
and sometimes hard.
Third, in the overﬂow pointer corruption (Section IV-A.3),
depending on the corrupt value, MySQL gives widely different
reactions ranging from marking the table as crashed (♠ in
Table II) to killing the executed query (♣), and sometimes
silently returning without any error-code (•).
Fourth, in the index format corruption (Section IV-A.4),
Table III clearly depicts how format corruptions are handled
in an inconsistent manner, depending on the workload and on
the corrupt value. For example, when the key reference length
in the base header is corrupted, sometimes the corruption is
detected (
√
), but sometimes it is not. When the corruption is
not detected, MySQL sometimes returns incorrect results to
the user ( =) and at times crashes (×).
Fifth, in the record format corruption (Section IV-A.5),
when a query hits a corrupt dynamic-record length, depending
on the corrupt value, MySQL sometimes stops the query and
returns only valid records that have been fetched so far, but
sometimes emits a hard error message saying that the table
has been marked as crashed.
In summary, we believe that MySQL does not have a
proper framework for corruption handling. When inconsistent
handling is observed, usually it implies that the corruption
handling code is diffused throughout the code base [14],
[30]. Such diffusion usually results in unpredictable and often
undesirable fault-handling strategies, which might turn into
frustration for human debugging [30].
C. Summary
We have found that MySQL does not detect and handle
corruptions well. We believe that the observations we have
made are not speciﬁc to MySQL; in addition to MySQL, we
have applied our fault injection method to PostgreSQL version
8.3, another open source DBMS. Our initial experiment shows
that PostgreSQL has similar problems as MySQL. For exam-
ple, in PostgreSQL, pages in the index ﬁle store left and right
sibling pointers. When the right sibling pointer of a page is
corrupted so that it points to one of its left sibling pages, the
SELECT query on the table based on index scan makes theserver to hang as it hits an inﬁnite loop. Beyond the scenario
described above, we have also injected 24 more corruptions to
PostgreSQL and found that 12 of them highlight the problems
observed in this section.
V. OFFLINE CORRUPTION
Online detection of hundreds of possible corruption scenar-
ios is often not feasible. One primary reason is because full
cross-checks must be performed to detect all scenarios. Thus,
a DBMS ofﬂine checker should be the last tool that catches
all corruptions in the database. When a corruption has been
detected by an ofﬂine checker, a repair utility can be run, thus
restoring the tables to a consistent condition. However, if the
ofﬂine checker misses some corruption scenarios, one would
not run the repair utility and corrupt data can leak into the
running system, which may cause more corruptions.
In this section, we analyze the robustness of the MySQL
ofﬂine checker, myisamchk, in dealing with the same cor-
ruption scenarios we have injected in the online case. This
checker runs in two modes: check and repair. In this ﬁrst mode,
myisamchk attempts to ﬁnd all corruptions in the database,
while in the second, it tries to rebuild the tables and index
ﬁles. Thus, we pose two questions:
1) Can myisamchk ﬁnd all corruptions in the database?
2) Can myisamchk correctly repair the database?
To answer these questions, we ﬁrst present the results of
our fault-injection experiments on myisamchk (Section V-A)
and then summarize our observations (Section V-B).
A. Results
1) Check Mode: We have injected the same B-Tree and
overﬂow pointer corruptions described in Sections IV-A.1
and IV-A.3. All cases except one are detected by myisamchk;
myisamchk crashes when a left-most key points to the same
page where the key is stored. More detailed observation shows
that in many cases of detected corruptions, the error messages
thrown do not precisely describe the injected corruptions. This
suggests that the checks performed do not capture the actual
corruptions. Hence, perhaps it is not surprising to discover a
corner-case bug.
The most interesting ﬁndings of our ofﬂine experiments
arose when we inject format corruptions (as in Section IV-
A.4). As depicted in Table IV, the ofﬂine checker blindly trusts
some format information. As a result, the checker crashes (×)
when such information is not as expected. This system crash is
unacceptable because a checker should not trust any value it
retrieves from the disk; its basic purpose is to ﬁnd corrupt
metadata. Other than this, Table IV also shows that many
corruption scenarios are left undetected.
Format info 0 < > Max
State header
header length
√ √
.
√
keys
√ √ √ √
number of records
√ √ √ √
data ﬁle length
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Base header
reclength
√ √
. .
pack reclength . .
√
×
rec reﬂength
√ √ √ √
key reﬂength
√ √ √ √
max key blk len × . . .
ﬁelds . .
√ √
Key def
keysegs
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block length
√
.
√
×
Key segment
length
√ √ √
×
Record info
length . .
√ √
TABLE IV
Ofﬂine detection of format corruption. The table reports my-
isamchk corruption handling of different format corruptions. “×”,
“.”, and “
√
” represent server crash, ignored corruption, and detection
respectively.
2) Repair Mode: When we inject format corruptions, we
also ﬁnd that the repair performed by myisamchk could
be problematic. For example, when the record length (“re-
clength”) speciﬁed in the base header of the index ﬁle is
corrupted, myisamchk throws an error message saying that
it found wrong records in the data ﬁle and suggests a repair.
When the repair is ﬁnished, however, all records in the table
are discarded and the record length still remains corrupted.
After studying the code, we determined the reason. In
MySQL the record length is essential to parsing records from
the data ﬁle. However, myisamchk assumes that this ﬁeld is
always correct. Thus, once the ﬁeld gets corrupted, it will
never locate the corruption. Then during the repair, myisamchk
will not be able to read any record from the data ﬁle by using
the wrong record length, thus leaving no record after the repair.
In fact, this erroneous repair could be avoided by a simple
ﬁx, which makes use of the redundant information inside the
data ﬁle itself and from the format ﬁle.
B. Observations
In summary, our results show that the ofﬂine checker
myisamchk is far from robust; it does not catch all corruptions
and it does not always repair the database correctly. Our
observations point to the same issues faced by the running
MySQL (Section IV-B). Mainly, some detectable corruptions
are ignored and some corruptions are not detectable due to the
lack of redundant information. As a result, the checker itself
can crash and even worse an erroneous repair could happen.
The fact that myisamchk does not perform a complete set
of checks is not surprising given the minimal implementation# Checks Performed
4 Checking data ﬁle:
Check validity of deleted block links, deleted frames,
overﬂow pointers, size of deleted blocks
9 Checking keys:
Check delete links (range-check and alignment),
compare key-value pairs (range-check and alignment),
check record-pointer, page length, auto-increment key.
2 Checking ﬁle sizes:
check length of index and data ﬁle
15 Total
TABLE V
Checks performed by myisamchk. The table summarizes the 15
checks performed by the MySQL ofﬂine checker.
of the checker (under 2000 lines of code). A more detailed
study shows that the checker only performs 15 checks, shown
in Table V. Many important checks are either omitted or
overlooked. Redundant information in the format ﬁle (e.g.,
column and key deﬁnitions, ﬁle size, record count, etc.) is
not used to verify the consistency of the index ﬁle. B-Tree
checks are also not comprehensive. For example, key-value
pairs comparison is done only on per-page level; key-value
ordering across siblings and parent/child is not checked. Thus,
there is room for improvement in building a more robust
MySQL checker.
VI. CONCLUSION
In the world of storage systems, it would be ideal if RAID
storage guaranteed that data was not corrupt. Unfortunately, no
such guarantee is possible (though techniques can make the
odds of perceived corruption lower). Thus, a DBMS must, at
the highest level, be responsible for the correctness of its data.
This notion is particularly true of the DBMS metadata, which
no client of the DBMS can even access; if the DBMS does
not safeguard its own metadata, no other components can.
In this paper, we have begun the exploration of the data
corruption problem on database management systems. We
have shown that the MySQL and PostgreSQL DBMSs do not
tolerate such faults particularly well, and that MySQL ofﬂine
checker catches some but not all corruptions, thus leaving the
system susceptible to corruption if it arises.
However, we believe our work is only the ﬁrst step towards
the “hardening” of database management systems to the prob-
lems of corruption. Many problems remain, including:
Online checking: A running DBMS should likely perform
internal integrity checks while it runs to protect against other
forms of corruption, including those from bad memory [23]
as well as from disk.
There is a large body of work regarding techniques for de-
tecting and recovering from data corruption [35], including the
use of in-memory redundancy with checksums and replicas,
or the use of fault-tolerant data structures [3], where a single
pointer fault cannot lose a large amount of data, unlike what
we have seen in Section IV-A.1. Although all these techniques
are not new, it would be interesting to ﬁnd out why they are
not deployed in practice. One reason might be a lack of study
in quantifying how much performance overhead is imposed
and how much reliability is gained when a certain redundancy
or protection is added. This would be an important issue to
look into further.
Aside from existing techniques, we believe a proper frame-
work is needed in deploying the techniques. One possible
solution is having a centralized framework that focuses on
corruption handling [14]. Without a centralized framework,
handling hundreds of corruption scenarios is proven to be
difﬁcult, diffused, and inconsistent.
Robust ofﬂine checkers: The existence of repair tools again
indicates that we need them in practice. However, as we have
observed, the repair process of checkers (both for DBMSs and
ﬁle systems) is typically ad hoc. Thus, the quest in building
more robust checkers has begun recently. For example, Gu-
nawi et al. utilize a declarative approach to write hundreds
of checks and repairs in a clear and compact manner [15].
Others have used more formal frameworks as the foundation
for corruption repair. For example, Khurshid et al. suggest the
use of symbolic execution [18] and Wang et al. deﬁne the
problem of corruption-repair as a global optimization problem
by using structural Hamming and edit distance [43].
Thus, further work is clearly required. Only through a
combined ofﬂine and online approach will a high-performance,
robust, and truly corruption-robust DBMS be realized.
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